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Abstract 
Phishing is a pervasive form of online fraud that causes billions in losses annually. Spear phishing is a 
highly targeted and successful type of phishing that uses socially engineered emails to defraud most of its 
recipients. Unfortunately, anti-phishing training campaigns struggle with effectively fighting this threat—
partially because users see security as a secondary priority, and partially because users are rarely 
motivated to undergo lengthy training. An effective training approach thus needs to be non-disruptive and 
brief as to avoid being onerous, and yet, needs to inspire dramatic behavioral change. This is a tremendous, 
unsolved challenge that we believe can be solved through a novel application of theory: Using fear appeals 
and protection-motivation theory (PMT), we outline how brief training can educate users and evoke 
protection motivation. We further invoke construal-level theory (CLT) to explain how fear appeals can 
stimulate threat perceptions more quickly and more powerfully. This research-in-progress study further 
proposes a field experiment to verify the effectiveness of our proposed training approach in an ecologically 
valid environment. Overall, we (1) improve training based on PMT and CLT, (2) expand PMT for guiding 
fear appeal design; and (3) demonstrate a full application of CLT. 
Keywords: Security, Spear phishing, Training, Fear Appeals, Protection Motivation Theory, Construal 
Level Theory  
 
 
  
 1 INTRODUCTION 
Phishing is a serious threat that caused more than US$5.9 billion in damages in 2013 (RSA 2014); and that 
number promises to rise: The recent Cyber Threat Report of cyber intelligence provider CYREN reports a 
steep 51% increase alone in the first three months of 2015. Indeed, the amount of phishing attacks has been 
rapidly growing, exceeding 7.5 trillion attacks in 2014, which is double the number from 2012 (McAfee 
Labs 2014). In every quarter of 2014, more than 197,252 new, unique attacks were executed (APWG 2014), 
and this number rises continuously. 
Across these rapidly growing and numerous attacks, one technique—spear phishing—stands out. Spear 
phishing is a highly targeted, context-specific attack that is directed at specific groups of individuals or 
organizations and aims to appear genuine to their members and employees (Wang et al. 2012). Compared 
to phishing, spear phishing is more sophisticated (Hong 2012), and inherently more dangerous—by 
magnitudes (Jagatic et al. 2007); more effective (its return rates are up to 40 times greater than those of 
ordinary phishing); and increasingly more frequent (FireEye 2012). Some particularly popular spear-
phishing attacks impersonate banks, which often lead to worrisome rates of success (APWG 2014). 
This persistent increase in the number of successful attacks suggests spear-phishing is far from being under 
control. Existing approaches aim to prevent victimization with the use of enhanced automated detection 
mechanisms and behavioral training (Hong 2012). However, automated solutions struggle to reliably detect 
customized and fast-moving spear-phishing attacks—rendering users vulnerable when they solely rely upon 
automated solutions (Abbasi et al. 2012). Moreover, even when these tools correctly raise the alarm, users 
often disregard such warning messages and continue with their imprudent behavior, leaving themselves 
vulnerable to spear-phishing attacks (Abbasi et al. 2015). In light of the deficiencies of automated solutions 
and users’ deviant behavior in using them, we turn to educational approaches to further learn how to increase 
organizational defenses against spear-phishing victimization. 
Although evidence suggests that anti-phishing training generally improves detection rates (Kumaraguru et 
al. 2010), the results do not evoke confidence in such training’s efficacy. Particularly for spear phishing, 
more than 70 percent of participants consistently fell victim to these highly tailored and targeted attacks—
sometimes even despite previous training (see Dodge et al. 2007; Ferguson 2005; Jagatic et al. 2007). 
Unfortunately, the existing approaches to behavioral training—which often focus solely on educating users 
about phishing—are deficient. Some researchers argue that one of the key challenges in delivering security 
education is motivating users to engage in protective behavior (Kumaraguru et al. 2010; Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010). If so, then effective anti-phishing training needs not only to inform users, but also needs to 
arouse a sense of fear that will elicit protection motivations, resulting in meaningful behavioral change (i.e., 
not fall victim to the phishing attack). Consequently, the current conundrum in research and practice is how 
anti-phishing training be conducted effectively without being onerous and disruptive of end-users’ time. 
This enigma forms the guiding research question of our research. 
To identify the attributes of effective anti-phishing training that hold potential to inform users and elicit 
protective motivations, we turn to protection-motivation theory (PMT). PMT explains the effect of fear 
appeals by identifying the cognitive processes that engender protective intentions. Fear appeals are 
“persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if 
they do not do what the message recommends” (Witte 1992, p. 329). Because fear appeals are brief, fear-
inducing communications, they hold potential to overcome the tedious nature of traditional training 
approaches to effectively raise protection motivation and subsequent behaviors. Recent IS research has 
adapted PMT from its traditional healthcare context and has argued it is well-suited for privacy (Milne et 
al. 2009) and security contexts (Boss et al. 2015). Likewise, IS research on security education, training and 
awareness (SETA) programs has recently explored the tenets of PMT to foster protective intentions (Posey 
et al. 2015). Whereas PMT has been widely applied across various areas, a theoretical account guiding the 
 design of fear appeals for effective, brief training of end users is still missing. To address this gap, we further 
draw from construal-level theory (CLT) to understand the mental representations that underlie the threat 
and coping response appraisal processes. These mental representations (i.e., construals) form the 
interpretive basis on which PMT’s cognitive processes engender protection motivation. Our purpose in 
invoking CLT is thus to explore whether and how the manipulation of these construals can aid evoking 
protection motivation, and thereby inform the design of anti-phishing training materials. 
Within the realm of phishing and PMT, our study offers three contributions. First, we address the necessity 
for brief and effective anti-phishing training by building upon PMT to understand how to deliver fear 
appeals that both inform and motivate. Second, we extend PMT by examining the design of fear appeals, 
using CLT as our theoretical lens to explain how the design of a fear appeal guides the mental representation 
that informs protective intention. This allows us to offer a unique theoretical account for how to design 
effective fear appeals that can be used in spear-phishing training. Third, we demonstrate a full utilization of 
CLT in an applied area, whereas applications of CLT are still rare outside of psychology, and whereas 
existing publications in IS examine only parts of CLT. These contributions are unique not only to the field 
of IS but also to all other disciplines that leverage fear appeals, PMT, and CLT.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Phishing and Spear Phishing 
Phishing is a method of social engineering that aims to induce recipients to expose personal information, 
such as contact details, user/network credentials, or credit card details. Typically, phishing targets a mass 
audience (Wright and Marett 2010) and succeeds in deceiving only a small percentage of the audience 
(Wright et al. 2014). For phishing to be effective, successful messages must be both believable and 
persuasive (Hong 2012). Believability is often achieved by mimicking communications from reputable 
persons or organizations (Wright and Marett 2010). A variety of techniques exist to boost persuasiveness 
(cf. Wright et al. 2014). 
However, spear phishing is dramatically more successful than traditional phishing, as it targets a specific 
group of recipients and leverages information that is specific to that group so as to increase its believability 
(Hong 2012). Spear-phishing attacks often appear to be genuine (Wang et al. 2012). Hence, detecting spear 
phishing requires that users pay close attention not only to obvious visual cues, but especially to the 
plausibility of the message. For example, Jagatic et al. (2007) mined social media to impersonate real friends 
of targets, and achieved a deception success rate over 70 percent. Similarly, Dodge et al. (2007) phished 
students exploiting their sensitivity to grade-related matters, and succeeded with eight out of ten students. 
Although the effort of tailoring phishing attacks to a specific audience makes this type of attack more costly, 
such attacks are far more successful and dangerous (FireEye 2012). Users often underestimate the ease of 
spoofing emails, and thus overrate the security and privacy of mail communications (Jagatic et al. 2007). 
2.2 Defense against Phishing 
Approaches to counter phishing attacks can be categorized into two broad classes: technical and educational. 
Technical approaches, such as anti-phishing tools, attempt to automatically identify fraudulent messages 
and either discard them immediately or warn the users of their potentially harmful nature. Research on 
technical solutions has led to improvements in detection accuracy (e.g., Abbasi et al. 2015), which have 
been found to be—along with speed and cost of error—crucial factors driving user’s reliance on such tools 
(Zahedi et al. 2015). However, technical approaches suffer from severe weaknesses. First, the fast-moving 
nature of phishing attacks stall detection rates at about 90 percent accuracy (Hong 2012); however, this is a 
woefully inadequate rate given the sheer volume of phishing attacks. Furthermore, automated warnings are 
 often overlooked or purposely ignored (Egelman et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2006). Consequently, technical means 
are incapable of offering sufficient protection against phishing attacks (Abbasi et al. 2012). In particular, 
spear phishing has proven apt at defeating existing security mechanisms (FireEye 2012). Thus, educational 
anti-phishing approaches are necessary to complement their technical counterparts, especially training that 
enables users to draw the appropriate conclusions from automated warnings (Lai et al. 2012). 
Educational approaches can significantly reduce the likelihood of falling for phishing attacks (Kumaraguru 
et al. 2010). Training enhances user’s self-efficacy, security knowledge, and suspicion—all factors that have 
been found significant in reducing deception success (Wright and Marett 2010). However, making anti-
phishing training salient among users has proven to be a difficult task (e.g., Ferguson 2005 who successfully 
phished 90 percent users who received a four hour trainign session on the very same day), because many 
users regard security as a secondary activity that is bothering at best and interfering at worst (Puhakainen 
and Siponen 2010). As a training technique, researchers have used feigned phishing attacks to probe users 
as a means to increase user’s motivation to protect themselves (Kumaraguru et al. 2010). However, feigned 
phishing attacks also often cause negative pushbacks among users, evident in their expression of anger and 
denial (Jagatic et al. 2007), and are thus—despite being effective in arousing awareness—ethically 
controversial (Jakobsson et al. 2008). Ideally, an educational approach could overcome motivational issues 
without evoking negative emotions in users. The motivation to actively engage in protective behaviors 
becomes especially salient for spear phishing, as this type of attack is well disguised and hard to detect 
based solely upon visual cues. Ferguson (2005) underlines the important role of motivation by reporting a 
startling 90 percent success rate when phishing freshmen shortly after preparing them with a four-hour long 
training session. Although the freshmen reported to be suspicious, the subject matter of the phishing attack 
(in this study: “a problem with your last grade”) easily overruled the arguably insufficient motivation to be 
cautious and engage in protective action. These results confirm the essential role of motivation as a salient 
trigger to an effortful protective process that aims to distinguish phishing messages from innocuous 
messages. 
2.3 Protection-Motivation Theory 
PMT is a theoretical model that explains and predicts the processes that elicit protection motivation in 
recipients of fear appeal communications. PMT’s core assumption is that fear appeals sequentially trigger 
cognitive appraisal processes, which jointly inform protection intentions. A successful fear appeal thereby 
raises protection motivation, which captures one’s intent to engage in protective behaviors in an effort to 
avoid the depicted dangers (Floyd et al. 2000). According to Rogers (1975), fear appeals must contain three 
essential stimulus variables: “(a) the magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the conditional 
probability that the event will occur provided that no adaptive behavior is performed […] and (c) the 
availability and effectiveness of a coping response that might reduce or eliminate the noxious stimulus” (p. 
97). A fear appeals thus stimulates protection motivation by firstly communicating a threat, and then 
subsequently outlining an adequate coping response. 
The initial threat appraisal process balances perceived threat severity, referring to one’s belief that a threat 
is serious and potentially serve (Rohm and Milne 2004), and perceived threat susceptibility, as one’s 
expectation of being susceptible to that particular threat (Rohm and Milne 2004), against the maladaptive 
rewards one gains from not engaging in protective action that would alleviate that threat (Floyd et al. 2000). 
When faced with a comprehensible and personally relevant threat, recipients further experience fear 
(Leventhal 1970). Fear has been conceptualized as a core mediator of protection motivation (Boss et al. 
2015). In contrast, the succeeding coping appraisal process evaluates the recommended coping strategy by 
comparing response efficacy, which refers to one’s belief in the efficacy of the protective action (Floyd et 
al. 2000), in conjunction with self-efficacy, relating to one’s perceived ability to actually perform the 
protective action (Floyd et al. 2000; Maddux and Rogers 1983), versus the response cost, which refers to 
 all costs that arise from carrying out the protective response (Floyd et al. 2000). Accordingly, PMT proposes 
that if the noxiousness of the threat outweighs the associated maladaptive rewards—and if the recommended 
coping response is perceived to be an executable, efficient and affordable resort—only then will a recipient 
be motivated to engage in the recommended protective response (Boss et al. 2015; Floyd et al. 2000; 
Maddux and Rogers 1983). 
For the design of effective fear appeals, PMT requires threat and coping appraisal perceptions (Milne et al. 
2000). Furthermore, Boss et al. (2015) show that threats must be personally relevant in order to engender 
fear and engender protective motivation. Beyond this basic guidance on how to design effective fear appeal 
manipulations, it is surprising how few studies have investigated the actual effects of specific manipulations. 
Instead of focusing on which information needs to be conveyed to effectively stimulate appraisal processes, 
existing studies have restrained to confirm that comics and pictures are superior to textual fear appeals 
(Dijkstra and Bos 2015; Kumaraguru et al. 2010); pleasure-evoking colors (blue) are more effective than 
less pleasure-evoking colors (yellow) (Wauters et al. 2008); or that positive consequences are more 
persuasive than negative consequences (Anderson and Agarwal 2010), which already deviates from the core 
purpose of a fear appeal; Thus, across the literature, general account or explanation of how to conduct 
effective fear-appeal design is missing. However, designing effective fear-appeals is elementary to the study 
of fear appraisal, and hence presents a unique opportunity to inform and contribute to PMT literature. 
2.4 Construal-Level Theory 
Construal-level theory holds potential to explain how fear appeals are represented mentally, and can thus 
inform our understanding of how fear-appeal design shapes cognitive appraisal. CLT proposes that people, 
to generate predictions about the future, form “abstract mental construals of distal objects” (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010, p. 440, emphasize added). The construal thereby serves a goal, and manifests itself as either 
a concrete or abstract mental representation, the latter thereby being more schematic, prototypical and hence 
simpler and less ambiguous (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Smith 1998). CLT coins concrete construals as being 
on the low-level end of the abstraction continuum, whereas abstract construals are on the high-level end of 
the continuum.  
The notion of CLT is strictly hierarchical: whereas abstract construals represent the conceptual idea of an 
object, concrete construals represent a more specific instantiation. Concrete and abstract construals are thus 
concrete and abstract mental representations of the same object, respectively, and are connected through 
hierarchical meaning: the high-level (abstract) construal determines the meaning of the low-level (concrete) 
construal more than the low-level construal the meaning of the high-level construal (Trope and Liberman 
2010). As illustration, an abstract spear-phishing construal would be perceived to be dangerous, whereas 
the same concrete construal would describe the dangers more specifically, such as “steals your credit card 
information.” When the high-level attribute “dangerous” changes to “safe,” the hierarchically connected 
low-level attribute “steals credit card information” vanishes, because it is inconsistent with the superordinate 
attribute of being “safe.” The superordinate attribute is hence more central to the meaning of the construal. 
2.4.1 Psychological distance 
Because construals serve as the basis of judgement and prediction, CLT proposes that construals mediate 
the consequences of psychological distance, which refers to the perception of something being either close 
or far away from the self (Trope and Liberman 2010). According to CLT, psychological distance is directly 
associated to construal level (Bar-Anan et al. 2006), and therefore describes the perceived distance between 
the present self and the construal. Feelings of distance can be evoked by moving the construal along a 
temporal (now vs. in the far future), spatial (here vs. far away), social (me vs. others) or hypothetical 
(realistic vs. hypothetical) dimension. Accordingly, one perceives a construal to be psychologically 
 proximate if it is construed to be present in the here and now, involving oneself, realistically. By contrast, a 
construal is perceived to be distant if it is located in the future, somewhere else, and involves others, and 
takes place hypothetically.  
2.4.2 Purpose and Features 
CLT proposes that with increasing psychological distance, the gestalt of the construal changes. According 
to Liberman and Förster (2009) and Steidle et al. (2011), there is a bilateral association between 
psychological distance and construal level, such that a greater psychological distance is accompanied by a 
higher construal level (i.e., thinking that is more abstract), whereas a more proximate distance is 
accompanied by a lower construal level (i.e., thinking that is more concrete) (Bar-Anan et al. 2006). Trope 
and Liberman (2010) propose that this is due to a shift in purpose: Because proximate (i.e., imminent) threats 
demand an immediate response, an understanding of “how am I threatened” is needed. To answer such 
demand, concrete construals are formed that entail viable details of the specific threat, and thus serve the 
purpose of explaining its feasibility—how it exactly works. By contrast, distant threats do not require such 
immediate response, but demand a judgement of “whether I will be threatened.” As a result, abstract 
construals are formed that focus on the general desirability of the threat (in abstract terms, not one particular 
instance), and thus serve the purpose to evaluate its desirability—does it need to be avoided? 
Following the purpose, CLT proposes that abstract construals exhibit central features that relate to 
desirability and omit peripheral features that relate to feasibility (Trope and Liberman 2010). For example, 
if the purpose is to understand how to detect a spear-phishing attack, a low-level construal might feature 
specific attributes of the message, such as whether it will carry a personal greeting, impersonate a specific 
institution, or requests credit card details, as such information is crucial for detecting the attack. However, 
when moving to a higher construal, for which the purpose is to understand the consequences of falling victim 
to a spear-phishing attack, these features become irrelevant. Instead, features relating to the concept of spear 
phishing are salient characteristics of such an abstract construal. 
The application of CLT in research is still rather limited. In IS, two studies published in premier outlets 
apply CLT to recommendation systems (cf. Köhler et al. 2011) and systems adoption (cf. Ho et al. 2014). 
Despite the pioneering role of these CLT-based studies, these studies did not yet have the opportunity to 
fully leverage the full notion of CLT, nor explore construal features and psychological distance 
manipulations to stimulate construal formation. However, CLT yields a unique opportunity to understand 
the interpretative basis of cognitive processes, and we explore its notion to guide the design of more 
persuasive fear appeals by modelling the attributes of low- and high-level construals.  
3 RESEARCH MODEL 
Based on CLT’s understanding of how concrete and abstract construals emphasize different purposes and 
features, and ultimately form the basis for prediction and judgement, we combine CLT and PMT’s appraisal 
processes to form our research model (Figure 1). Particularly, we argue that threat and coping appraisal 
 process each draws upon a construal to enable its cognitive judgement. Thus, we model that a spear-phishing 
threat construal and an anti-phishing coping response construal informs each respective appraisal process.  
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 Figure 1. Research model 
3.1 Psychological Distance and Self-Perceptions 
The first difference between concrete and abstract construals is their relative position to the self 
(psychological distance). Thus, PMT constructs that evaluate self-perceptions are likely stimulated by 
traversing construal’s relative position to the self (psychological distance). Such constructs are threat 
vulnerability, maladaptive rewards, self-efficacy, and response cost. The remaining constructs of PMT’s 
appraisal processes are independent of the self and relate to the construal’s gestalt; and thus remain 
unaffected by changes in psychological distance.  
Intuitively, the construal of a spear-phishing attack that takes place proximately provokes a more immediate 
perception of risk than does an attack that takes place distally. Similarly, maladaptive rewards that are 
construed to be attainable proximately receive higher appraisal than rewards that are attainable distally. 
Indeed, research on risk taking suggests this temporal connection between reward appraisal (Smithson 
2008). As a farther psychological distance is associated with a higher-level construal, we argue: 
H1a: A high-level spear-phishing threat construal leads to lower threat vulnerability perceptions. 
H1b: A high-level spear-phishing threat construal leads to lower maladaptive rewards perceptions. 
Similarly, when evaluating one’s efficacy in executing the coping response, psychological distance dictates 
the perception of whether the coping response is in need to be executed proximately, that is soon, 
realistically, by oneself; or distally, that is in the far future, by someone else, hypothetically. Accordingly, 
a more abstract coping response is likely to elicit lower levels of self-efficacy. Furthermore, because 
concrete construals convey more specific procedural details of what needs to be done, this argument is 
further supported by Arachchilage and Love (2014) who find that users require procedural (concrete) and 
 conceptual (abstract) knowledge to build up self-efficacy perceptions, while in contrast, conceptual 
knowledge alone is insufficient. Thus, we argue: 
 H2a: A high-level response construal leads to lower self-efficacy perceptions. 
Finally, likewise to maladaptive rewards, response costs are similarly discounted if they are distal. Hence, 
costs that are construed to incur proximately receive higher appraisal than costs that are construed to occur 
distally.  
H2b: A high-level response threat construal leads to lower response cost perceptions. 
3.2 Features of Threat and Coping Response 
Differences in psychological distance command differences in construal level: Abstract construals carry 
high-level features that relate to desirability, whereas concrete construals exhibit low-level features that 
relate to feasibility. These differences affect two PMT variables that are concerned with evaluating the 
nature of threat and coping response: For the first, threat severity, CLT argues that a concrete construal of a 
spear-phishing attack with low-level features (e.g., sender address, firm logo, link to website) enables an 
understanding of what constitutes an attack; whereas an abstract construal with high-level features (e.g., 
deceptive, dangerous) enables an understanding of the impact of an attack—which we predict to evoke 
higher threat perceptions. Indeed, previous research has shown that the abstract handling of information 
systems (i.e., the way managers do—in contrast to technical staff) increases security risk perceptions 
(Goodhue and Straub 1991). Thus, we propose that an abstract spear-phishing attack construal’s focus on 
the (un)desirability of victimization increases the threat severity perceptions. 
H1c: A high-level spear-phishing threat construal leads to higher threat severity perceptions. 
Similarly, when evaluating the efficacy of the coping response, the question becomes whether it works. 
Addressing this question requires conceptual knowledge—knowledge about the outcome of the coping 
response, rather than knowledge about its workings (McCormick 1997). Again, because abstract construals 
emphasize features that relate to desirability, we predict that such construals increase response efficacy 
perceptions—rather than concrete construals that focus on feasibility; on how it works. 
H2c: A high-level response construal leads to higher response efficacy perceptions. 
4 RESEARCH PLAN 
We plan to conduct a field experiment in which we will train a large body of individuals about the ins and 
outs of spear phishing through fear appeal messages; and then will probe the effectiveness of the trainings 
through a feigned spear-phishing attack targeting the participants, for which we follow the guidelines for 
ethical fraud experiments outlined by Jakobsson et al. (2008). Because we objectively observe subject’s 
behavior (i.e., whether they fall for the feigned spear-phishing attack) within the context of their day-to-day 
lives, we ecologically validate the applicability of our theory, and avoid the problematic discrepancy 
between self-reported intentions and behaviors which is often found in security contexts (Workman 2008). 
Our research design aims at treating subjects with concrete or abstract construals of the two core fear appeal 
elements: threat and response. For the other PMT-related measures, we mainly rely upon validated 
instruments of Boss et al. (2015). We expect to conduct the experiment later this year. 
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